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Abstract 
This paper engages with debates about the need for a deeper theorisation of the political 
and spatial aspects of socio-technical transitions by examining the relevance of the concept 
of political technology for this body of theory. Political technologies are systematic and 
applied frameworks deployed to advance specific strategies to transform governments and 
societies. Looking at the role of political technologies within processes of systemic 
innovation, I propose that political technologies develop within socio-technical regimes in 
purposive attempts to transform them. From this perspective, socio-technical transitions 
emerge in relation to the visions that inspire them, the forms of knowledge that enable their 
implementation and how they relate to access to resources and innovations.  
 
To illustrate the argument, the paper presents a case study of a socio-technical transition 
that took place in Spain with the consolidation of the electricity industry and the development 
of a national electricity network during Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975). Such transition 
was possible within the framework of a politics of building hydraulic works, whereby certain 
spaces where designated as reservoirs of water. The way in which such networks were 
constituted still resonates with Spanish energy policy today.  
Keywords: Territorialisation, political technologies, energy transitions, hydropower, Spain 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks to Yvonne Rydin for timely feedback on the paper. Thanks to all the people that 
supported me during fieldwork, especially Lourdes Broto, Pablo Castán and Jorge Naya. 
Thanks to Emilio Garcés and Francisca Castillo, ‘the last of Jánovas’, and all the people who 
over the years resisted endogenous colonialism in a myriad of ways. Thanks to Begoña 
Oliván for the most compelling account of life in Sobrarbe in the mid twentieth century. 
Thanks to Pedro Santorromán and his family with whom we enjoyed fresh crespillos. Finally, 
2 
 
thanks to the three anonymous referees of the paper for their feedback and to Flor Avelino 
for keeping me on my toes.  
1. Introduction 
In Spain, energy transitions go hand in hand with political debates. In 2013, the Spanish 
government restructured the energy sector passing a law that taxes electricity self-
generation for all consumers connected to the grid. For those who had invested in 
renewables at a small scale this measure constituted a tremendous shock because it 
effectively meant that self-generation would be more expensive than buying electricity 
directly from large utilities. The decision was puzzling because, to date, Spain had played a 
leading role in the transition to renewables, for example, by being the first country in Europe 
to require the installation of photovoltaic panels in newly built developments. The 
government argued that this was a key measure to address the energy deficit, that is, the 
perceived gap between production costs and the income from the fees collected from 
consumers. Academic Mañé Estrada (2013) has described this as an unethical measure 
that, apart from compromising the development of renewable technologies, extracts surplus 
value from already impoverished energy consumers. In her words, the new law 
demonstrated that the major energy companies, acting as an oligopoly, had effectively 
‘captured the state’, so that it operated to advance their particular interests.   
In Spain, the politics of energy are grounded on a carefully calculated narrative of an energy 
deficit. The energy deficit has become the problem to solve, rather than the symptom of 
decades of energy policy. Yet, as a narrative, it has supported a process of energy sector 
restructuring which will likely maintain the paradigm of a centralised electricity network 
dependent on fossil fuels and nuclear energy, instead of contemplating the possibilities 
opened by a distributed electricity network that could incorporate a variety of energy 
sources, especially renewables. This represents both an attempt to redirect electricity rents 
to the main electricity utilities in the name of a putative energy deficit and to control the use 
and diffusion of new technologies. While in the short-term the justification is an economic 
one, the long term vision is one in which big producers continue to control the technologies 
for electricity generation and distribution.  
This example illustrates the overarching theme that inspires this paper, about how socio-
technical transitions unfold over space in tandem with complex political projects. The case of 
Spain shows how political and economic powers intervene in socio-technical transitions 
through attempts to control the territories over which sustainable innovations are allowed (or 
not) to unfold. In the case explained above, the use of renewables is sanctioned within 
existing provision systems but the law limits renewables when they are not fully integrated in 
the dominant energy markets. Critics such as Mañé Estrada argue that this regulation 
regime focuses on supporting large utilities to invest in windfarms and hydropower plants but 
effectively prevents small-scale generation with, for example, photovoltaic panels. In this 
way, the new regulation curtails access to new technologies to entrepreneurial citizens thus 
maintaining the dominant regime of electricity provision dominated by a few utilities. The 
socio-technical transition from fossil fuels to renewables in Spain depends on the political 
decisions that have led to restructuring the energy sector.  
Socio-technical transitions relate to the spatial production of inequality in terms of access to 
both energy resources and innovations with the potential to challenge incumbent regimes. 
Political technologies refer to technologies, applied frameworks to think systematically about 
the world, which can be deployed to advance political projects, that is, deliberate attempts to 
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transform society and space (Collier, 2014; Lakoff & Collier, 2010). For example, in the case 
of the restructuring of the energy sector in Spain, the calculation of the energy deficit is a key 
political technology which casts responsibilities for energy production as part of a national 
project. Territories, in particular, are political technologies which helped in the formation of 
nation states (Elden, 2010a). Where innovation has been crucial to develop territorial logics, 
such as with the construction of electricity networks, innovation territories are political 
technologies which link processes of socio-technical change with broader political projects.  
For the best part of the 20th century, energy utilities in Spain were able to shape both energy 
and territorial policies, from structuring distribution networks to designating spaces and 
populations in relation to energy generation needs. The 1940s in Spain marked a transition 
from a fragmented landscape of energy production with multiple private electricity providers 
to the concentration of production in a few large companies driven by public investment and 
the constitution of a national and centralised energy distribution network. These 
developments paved the way for a new transition two decades later from a distributed 
system of medium-sized hydropower plants to large thermal energy plants. Overall, these 
events marked the consolidation of the transition from small-scale generation to a unified 
energy network in Spain during the period of Franco’s dictatorship, from 1939 till 1975. The 
transition towards a centralised energy network is a paradigmatic example of how 
technological transitions are linked to political technologies that map such transitions over 
specific locations.  
Historical studies of socio-technical transitions have drawn on the multi-level perspective 
(e.g. Geels, 2002, 2005, 2010) as a heuristic to map dynamics of change. In this paper I 
argue that the notion of political technologies may address some of the blind spots of the 
multilevel perspective and cognate theories, in relation to politics and space. This is done, in 
the tradition of the multi-level perspective, with a historical analysis of energy transitions in 
Spain, written in a manner that emphasises its linkages to political and spatial projects. The 
case illustrates the deployment of political technologies for socio-technical change in relation 
to:  1) visions of modernity, technology and nationalism; 2) mechanisms of technological 
calculation; and 3) a system of inclusions and exclusions affecting both spaces and 
technologies over a given territory. Characterised by these three aspects, innovation 
territories emerge as political technologies that shape the dynamics of socio-technical 
transitions. 
2. Political technologies and socio-technical transitions  
In the last years an interest in politics has shaped debates within the field of transitions to 
sustainability (Avelino, 2009, 2011; Hendriks & Grin, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2009, 2011; Shove 
& Walker, 2007; Smith & Stirling, 2010). Questions of power, management and purposive 
change have always been integral to studies of socio-technical transitions. In debates about 
transitions to sustainability, tied to the analysis of transitions in-the-making,  much research 
has focused on the governance and management of transitions (e.g. Elzen, Geels, & Green, 
2004; Grin et al., 2010; Loorbach & Rotmans, 2006; Smith, Stirling, & Berkhout, 2005). 
Transition studies have thus studied the actors who intervene in transitions, their capacity 
and motivations and how they are able or not to steer transition processes in particular 
directions (Smith & Stirling, 2010; Smith Stirling, & Berkhout, 2005). However, scholars have 
called for both a deeper theorisation of power (Avelino, 2011) and an understanding of how 
socio-technical transitions relate to spatial transformations, with specific political 
consequences (Coenen et al., 2012). Coutard and Rutherford (2010) emphasise how 
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systemic change impacts are spatially differentiated. What is missing in most analyses of 
socio-technical transitions is a specific consideration of how socio-technical change is 
territorialised, that is, how it is purposively ordered over space, and the political 
consequences of this process.  
 
Innovation territories are a type of political technology that relates socio-technical transitions 
to the deployment of a political project over space. The notion of political technology builds 
upon Foucault’s theory of the art of government as ‘the conduct of conduct’, that is, the 
governance of individual subjectivities so that individuals and groups regulate and order their 
actions and social relations (Foucault, 1991). Governmentality refers to an apparatus of 
techniques that aligns institutions, actors, procedures and rationalities to maintain the social 
order (Dean, 2010). Such techniques can be thought of as political technologies because 
they play a key role in coupling a set of practices with a regime of truth (McMahon, 2015). 
They are ‘technologies’ because they consist of systematic frameworks to think practically 
about the world in order to determine how to change it: they involve a process of 
rationalization (Collier, 2014; p. 4). They are ‘political’ because they are directed towards the 
regulation of communities and institutional regimes (Boyd et al., 2014). 
An institutional regime consists of an ensemble of norms, procedures and conventions that 
regulates conduct. Political technologies enable the exercise of political power by 
transforming or maintaining such regimes (Frankenberg, 2014). Moreover, these institutional 
regimes give meaning and enable the deployment of political technologies (Ibid). In this 
reading, political technologies are most often thought of comprising government 
administration, legislative and regulatory practices, and other security practices conducted 
by any public or private actors at the service of the state. Alongside statisticians, lawyers and 
politicians, engineers and experts play a key role in the construction of the state. Because 
political technologies draw attention to the production of applied knowledge, they are 
intimately linked with processes of social and technological innovation.  
This notion of institutional regime, as structuring power relations, stands in contrast with the 
notion of socio-technical regime, the unit of analysis in transition theories such as the 
multilevel perspective. Socio-technical regimes are understood as complex arrangements of 
technologies, resources, beliefs, practices and norms which appear as stable structures and 
resist change (Dijk, Orsato, & Kemp, 2014; Geels, 2002; Kemp, 1994). Like institutional 
regimes, socio-technical regimes can be seen as an ensemble of norms and procedures, 
with the explicit inclusion of technologies, material objects and the institutional frameworks 
that embed them in social settings. However, socio-technical regimes relate to a particular 
system of use that organises objects and meanings for a quotidian purpose. In some sense, 
socio-technical regimes could be thought of as institutional regimes related to the regulation 
of conduct around a particular artefact, such as the car, the switch or the toilet. A socio-
technical regime presumes the inscription of uses and norms of use. While institutional and 
socio-technical regimes are not strictly the same, there is a close relationship between the 
ordering of both types of regimes. Political technologies involved in the dynamics of socio-
technical change represent intersections between both regimes. Analysing political 
technologies is thus a strategy for the study of the politics of socio-technical transitions.     
In the context of the making of nation states, Elden (2010a) has defined territory as a 
political technology comprising techniques for measuring physical land and controlling 
strategic terrains. He regards territory “as something extensive and calculable, extended in 
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three dimensions and grounded on the geometric point” (Elden, 2005). While he traces the 
birth of territory in relation to the development of the modern state, he highlights that territory 
boundaries are not as important as how territories are calculated because the process of 
territory demarcation makes exclusion and control possible (Elden, 2005, 2010b). 
Calculative projects for the technical and the legal demarcation of territories signal economic 
and strategic projects of space ordering.  Painter (2010) has described territories as the 
outcome of networked socio-technical practices. This means that the relationship between 
technologies and spaces cannot be reduced to how spatial patterns influence the formation 
of technologies or how technologies can explain the formation of particular spatial patterns 
as if any of them could be an explanatory factor for the other. Instead, the question is how is 
it that both territories and technologies are simultaneously constituted within particular 
arrangements and assemblages of material technologies and discourses.  
Sometimes processes of socio-technical change are intimately linked to the constitution of a 
territory, in the strict political sense. This is exemplified magisterially by the technology 
historian Schiffer (2005) who analysed the pioneering use of the electric arc in lighthouses 
as a means to perform safe maritime practices. This technological change played a key role 
in international relations during the nineteenth century in countries such as England and 
France. Electric arcs in lighthouses became a political technology because of their 
symbolism as “conspicuous beacons of modernity” (Ibid, p. 294). Electric arcs in lighthouses 
were intimately linked to the formation of innovation territories.  
Innovation territories refer to territories in which a political project of purposive change 
depends on  socio-technical transitions. Socio-technical transitions are most often imagined 
on a national scale precisely because ideas of modernity in the West have been predicated 
over the explicit connection between socio-technical transitions and nation-building projects. 
In countries like Spain, for example, the constitution of a national territory has come hand in 
hand with technological transitions that enable the nation state to claim authority over 
particular peoples and places.  In summary, political technologies relate to forms of authority 
that shape the possibilities of action for people and the territories in which they live 
(Foucault, 2010). The deployment of an active project of purposive change can be linked to 
a will to improve that expands into multiple spheres of life (Li, 2007). The success of different 
actors in deploying political technologies for governing is related to their capacity to make 
their case compelling and calculable (Bulkeley, Castán Broto, & Edwards, 2014). The 
formation of innovation territories, as political technologies, requires both a compelling vision 
and a series of techniques of calculation to link proposed practices to field truths in the 
Foucaldian sense.  
Making compelling a case for innovation requires a series of persuasive arguments that 
organise an effective constellation of actors around a shared problematic (Bulkeley, Castán 
Broto, & Edwards, 2014). For example, when a transition is coupled with a particular identity 
project, such as building a nation in the name of progress, it will be constituted as an 
innovation territory. Thus, as sovereignty projects, innovation territories are linked to the 
production of compelling visions. While the notion of future visions is salient in studies of 
transitions to sustainability (Loorbach & Rotmans, 2006), political technologies also draw 
attention to the ways in which the constitution of technological assemblages is mapped onto 
the development of imagined territories over which such technologies are overlaid. In the 
context of nation states such as Spain, technological visions have inscribed national 
identities in innovation territories.  
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This process of territorial authority is also predicated upon the capacity of the state to 
establish suitable practices of calculation which align a compelling vision and a constellation 
of actors with the possibility to deploy such projects over space. The demarcation of field 
truths over space requires both a repertoire of accounting techniques, directed towards 
bringing field observations with compelling practices, and a series of subjectification 
techniques that facilitate the normalisation of those truth making practices. From surveying 
to economic valuation technologies, the constitution of innovation territories is most often 
related to the inscription of given locales in networks of global circulation but it also requires 
the enrolment of local actors. The effectiveness of a technology in a given socio-technical 
context depends on the constant rearrangement of alignments between ongoing discourses 
and material transformations (Moss, 2014).  
Such rationalities pertain the deployment of technology and its insertion in existing planning 
systems and bureaucratic apparatuses. Political technologies thus draw spaces of exclusion 
and inclusion because they establish patterns of resource access and environmental 
impacts and predetermine who has control over the process of technological innovation. 
Who has access to technology is as relevant as who can influence the process of 
technological change. Overall, the concept of political technologies relates transitions studies 
to three issues: the creation of compelling visions of territorial and technological 
development; the calculations directed at translating such visions onto space; and the 
demarcation of areas of inclusion and exclusion in relation to a given technology (Figure 1). 
These aspects structure the analysis of the empirical case of the production of hydropower 
and hydraulic politics in Spain. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3. Hydropower and territorial regulation in the rivers Ara and Cinca in Huesca, Spain 
The history of water politics in Spain is read as a national project around the ‘hydraulic 
paradigm’, that is, the idea that there is an injustice derived from the scarcity of water for 
irrigation which can be easily solved through large hydraulic works (Saurı́ & del Moral, 2001). 
Swyngedouw (1999, 2007) has described such water politics in relation to visions of 
modernity that emphasised the need to control nature and which later evolved into scalar 
tactics and strategies that matched Franco’s fascist project and the dominant rhetoric of 
agricultural development. While state actors led the development of hydraulic infrastructure, 
a network of varied interests- hydropower,construction companies and farmers associations- 
worked together to promote and benefit from this strategy (Pavón Gamero, 2012).  
 
Hydropower has played a key role in Spain’s water politics project  (Frolova, 2010). The 
hydraulic paradigm was coupled with a technological project that led to the consolidation of 
the electricity industry and the growth of electricity production (Arroyo Ilera, 2008). The 
alignment of fascist nation-building dreams with the interests of the nascent electricity 
industry led to the consolidation of territories of hydropower and fundamentally shaped the 
modernisation project in Spain.  This was made possible through a transition from a 
fragmented landscape of electricity production to the consolidation of institutional and 
physical infrastructures of energy production and distribution. Such project also required the 
ordering of land and population, as the former was classified into different forms of 
production and the latter was relocated to reservoirs of labour.  
7 
 
The multi-level perspective  can be applied to explain the transition towards electricity, which 
initially was promoted in niches, with the development of local distribution systems led by 
small private companies such as the pioneering company ‘La Catalana’ in Barcelona. Small 
private companies based their distribution on direct current systems and hence, forced 
companies to generate electricity close to the place where it was used. The introduction of 
alternate current distribution systems in the early 20th century enabled a move from 
distributed to centralised generation systems. This was the first step towards the 
consolidation of the electricity network in a few large companies with large generation 
facilities at a time in which more than 70% of electricity production was generated in 
hydraulic plants. The establishment of Franco’s dictatorship and the raise of a hydraulic 
politics provided the perfect landscape for the consolidation of this socio-technical regime, 
and the spread of a centralised electricity system over the whole Iberian Peninsula. The 
deployment of a centralised electricity network in Spain was akin to the constitution of 
hydropower territories as political technologies, which would discipline both land and 
population to conform to the demands of Franco’s regime. This is something that the multi-
level perspective does not fully explain.  
The constitution of innovation territories is particularly visible in Spain when looking 
historically beyond the constitution of electrical territories as a national project, focusing 
instead on how such project unfolded in particular locales, and the extent to which it was 
successful in translating modernity discourses to concrete locations. The analysis in the 
following sections focuses on the technological transition and the constitution of a highly 
symbolic hydropower territory in the river Cinca and its subsidiary, the Ara river, within a 
broader area called Sobrarbe. These rivers mark the heyday of hydropolitics in Spain and 
their dismissal at the end of the 20th century. The Cinca is today a giant reservoir with two 
gigantic dams- El Grado and Mediano- and a rosary of hydropower installations shaping its 
ecology. The Ara is today a wild river, but its history has been shaped by a hydraulic project 
originally conceived in 1917 and dismissed in 2001- a century of projecting hydraulic politics 
over space. The parallel histories of these rivers demonstrate the constitution of innovation 
territories through technological transitions.  
This case study has been assembled from an heterogeneous set of materials, to reconstruct 
an historical account independent from dominant discourses of modernisation and 
electrification. This set of materials includes historical records held in the provincial archive 
of Huesca and the local archives of the villages of Mediano, Tierrantona and Fanlo. This is a 
highly fragmented collection of documentation from 1939-1975 relating to both the projecting 
of dams and the responses to them. Thus, the collection includes actual planning documents 
submitted by hydropower companies, notifications of expropriation, municipal edicts, letters 
to and from affected residents and other documentation that relates indirectly to the cases 
(for example, an extensive administrative record of the relocation of Mediano after flooding). 
These records were complemented with records from the archives of two regional 
newspapers (Nueva España/Diario del Altoaragón from 1936 to today; and Heraldo de 
Aragón from 1909 till today), which contained information about the context of hydropower 
development pre-1939 and provided some fragmentary information of regime-sanctioned 
views on dam construction from 1939 till 1975. The documents above contained no records 
of contestation to the building of dams, largely because the dictatorship’s information 
apparatus censored any kind of opposition to mainstream views. Thus, alternative accounts 
of the implementation and impacts of the projects were assembled using documentation 
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published post-1975, including, for example, allegations and written communications against 
project documentation submitted during two periods of public inquiry in 1982 and 2001, 
some of which document some aspects of the history of the case. Informal unstructured 
interviews about experiences of displacement were conducted with 11 individuals that had 
lived in villages flooded by the dam. Secondary sources were also used, including a study of 
depopulation in the area of study that compiled both population records in church archives 
and ethnographic information about the structure of society before and after the construction 
of the dams (Cuesta, 2001). The narrative focuses on the constitution of innovation 
territories hydropower production. Following the rationale proposed in Figure 1, the following 
sections describe : 1) the constitution of compelling visions of hydropower territories; 2) the 
deployment of specific techniques of calculation to control territorial processes and how local 
residents where enrolled, forcibly or not, into the process; and 3) the demarcation of spaces 
of exclusion and inclusion, especially, with regards to the development of technology and the 
dynamics of transitions.  
3.1. Compelling visions of hydropower territories 
The transition towards a uniform electricity network in Spain meant a conjoining of 19th 
century ideals of supporting farmers through irrigation and the change of scale in energy 
production that took place after the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). An agricultural 
modernisation vision followed the leadership of the Regenerationist movement at the end of 
the 19th century, an intellectual movement that sought to reimagine the political, social and 
economic system for a workable model of nation. The writings of one of its main thinkers, 
Joaquín Costa, constitute a call to move away from a decadent imperial history and focus 
instead on creating an educated, collective and reciprocal society. Costa addresses the farm 
labourer dispossessed by the corrupt redistribution of land and its concentration in large 
unproductive estates. Costa, with other regenerationists, conceives the small irrigated plot 
as the solution for the peasant, as it may allow for quality produce and diversification. The 
peasant is thought of as a servant of the plough; he needs to command it and to do so, 
needs to enlist the support of engineers and governments to harness the richness of Spain:  
“We have immense reservoirs of water in the mountains, and we can spill them with 
mathematical regularity onto our country, crossing it with an arterial hydraulic system 
that mitigates its heat and thirst…”  
In this account, water is the blood of Spain and the labourer its muscle. Costa’s discourse 
was directed in this way towards a nation building project (Swyngedouw, 1999). Solidarity 
between regions and between people to support the government in decisive actions was 
central to the Regenerationist discourse. Water works were also recognised as symbolising 
state power. This was a discourse that galvanised public opinion across the country, with 
ample calls for political leadership. The very constitution of hydraulic works as public goods, 
and the legal frameworks that made them possible, were very much under discussion during 
the first decades of the 20th century but this policy was not fully realised until the end of the 
civil war in 1939. In the late 1920s, extensive debates took place regarding the constitution 
of both irrigation fields and the ideal farmer that the uneducated labourer should transform 
into. The newly constituted hydrographic confederations, state organisations which governed 
river-basins, played a key role in constituting experimentation camps to demonstrate the 
operation of irrigation systems.  
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In the meantime, a parallel development was shaping the energy landscape. Experimental 
demonstrations of electrification in Barcelona and Madrid attracted investments and the first 
generation of small and private electricity companies quickly spread across the country. This 
was a wave comprising numerous companies of small capacity which represented the bulk 
of investments. Small companies were flexible enough to reach remote territories and thus, 
they contributed to extend electricity services over the national territory while bigger 
companies remained circumscribed to large urban markets such as Madrid and Barcelona 
(Balmas, 1995). The development of alternate current applications at the turn of the century 
made it possible to transport energy at great distances, and thus, led to the construction of 
the first large hydropower plants. Despite these advances in centralised generation and 
distribution, small providers remained active, particularly in areas where they could maintain 
the local supply with a relative small hydraulic installations. Towards the later 1920s the 
electrical sector underwent a profound transformation, tending towards the intervention of 
the state in investments in electricity networks and a change of scale in production that 
favoured larger hydraulic projects.  
This transition accelerated when Franco took power in 1939 after the Spanish Civil War. In 
1944, the 17 largest electrical companies of Spain, backed by a ministerial order, formed 
Electric Unity (UNESA). The main objective of UNESA was to combine existing networks 
into a unique national network, but it effectively constituted a unified market and established 
an electrical oligopoly. The achievement of this oligopoly was to match their interests with 
those of the associations of farmers and enrol the government in the construction of great 
dams to the point that hydraulic planning “was adjusted to the rhythm established by 
hydroelectric societies” (Arroyo Ilera, 2008; p. 43).  
This amalgamation of discourses for electricity generation and irrigation was predicated on 
two assumptions about the relationship between environment, society and development 
which came to be acutely felt in the region around the rivers Cinca and Ara. First, there was 
a merge of public and private interests when the interests of electric companies were 
conjoined with the government’s interest and the interests of irrigation farmers associations. 
Irrespective of their actual interests, their actions were underpinned by a common objective: 
building hydraulic works. Second, in line with a broad technocratic discourse of nature 
domination, there was an assumption about the possibility to ‘sacrifice’ certain regions in the 
interest of the national economy.  
Such assumptions began to crumble in the 1970s, and hence began the questioning of the 
hydraulic paradigm. By the 1980s, when the vision of hydropower territories began to be 
questioned, hydropower had lost its share of the electricity production of Spain, passing from 
78% of the market in 1940 to 43% in 1980. The discourses that made hydropower 
compelling during the dictatorship lost their power during the transition to democracy. The 
history of the Jánovas dam in the Ara river exemplifies this evolution. In 1944 Hidroeléctrica 
Ibérica IBERDUERO S.A., now one of the electric giants of Spain, acquired two concessions 
dating back to 1917 and 1923 from a small company “Applicaciones Industriales”. However, 
the first plan of 1945, approved in 1950, did not materialise. The company redefined the 
project to draw further capital, trying to gain support from the traditional network of actors 
within the hydraulic paradigm. However, as elaborated below, the changing political and 
social landscape changed the terms of what was acceptable before the company could 
adapt to a changing landscape.  
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Iberduero presented a daring project in 1972 which increased the capacity of proposed 
dams and argued that road works and expropriations should be financed by irrigation groups 
and other supposed beneficiaries (except those benefiting from the hydro-electric 
concession). Iberduero argued that these measures were needed to adapt to changing 
electricity markets: economic exploitation of the dam required both an exponential increase 
of scale and the collaboration of the whole society for the public good. The administration 
remained silent during 10 years and when the period of public allegations was reopened in 
1982 public support for hydraulic works had waned. Statements that during the dictatorship 
seemed reasonable, such as the possibility of financing hydropower projects by means other 
than private, were now put into question. The administrative records of public allegations1 
contain for example a letter from Santiago Marraco, then president of Aragón and a 
champion of the interests of irrigation farmers, in which he argues that Iberduero must, in 
any case, demonstrate the benefits for farmers and pay for works to channel the water to 
irrigation fields. The post-Franco democratic system also opened up the possibilities for new 
arguments about local development, the need to stop the rural exodus and the growing 
environmental impacts of dams. In the same administrative records, for example, there is a 
letter from the major of a local town, Ainsa, in which he presents an impact study and argues 
that the project has near to null local benefit, that the jobs created (estimated in 720 per 
year) are overestimated and that the environmental impacts will be unbearable. The 
newspaper pages of both the Heraldo and the Nueva España are full of letters of protest 
against the project.  
Hydropower projects were compelling within a particular conjuncture of water politics but 
once such vision waned their potential dwindled, because making such large infrastructure 
projects profitable depended on making a compelling vision that would draw direct capital 
investment from the state.  
3.2. Subject making and the calculation of hydropower territories 
Within the hydraulic paradigm, the calculative effort was interpreted as a struggle that 
required the coordination of multiple technologies and objectives. In the 1950s and 1960s 
newspapers regularly reported on updates on the hydraulic development of plans, how they 
were funded and their implementation. Franco’s nation-building project followed a narrative 
of war, and national territorial politics were interpreted as a battle: “In a battle, states draw a 
coordinated plan of all the elements that they suppose the enemy has. Once the plan is 
ready, the battle starts. In this plan… the Ministry of Public Works and of Agriculture have a 
great task in the execution and implementation of the Works. Hence the need for a 
coordination plan”2. Calculating- in the form of a plan- precedes the control of space.  The 
hydropower ‘battle’ was fought against both nature and the local economies which were 
perceived as an obstacle to progress.  
The constitution of hydropower territories was mediated by the figure of the engineer, as a 
director of territorial and technological ordering. In Spain, engineers were thought of as 
state-makers and, as portrayed in the local literature (Pallaruelo, 2011) and interviewees’ 
accounts, as ‘semi-gods’ that could make and unmake the lives of people. Engineers of the 
territory, for example, organised in a quasi-military body with uniforms, discipline procedures 
and ceremonies (el Cuerpo de Ingenieros de Montes), planned how different areas were to 
be included in a national modernity project. Remote valleys such as those of the Ara and 
                                                          
1
 Huesca Provincial Archive 
2
 Nueva España, 24/11/1960; no 7465. 
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high Cinca were deemed not worthy of development and thus, engineers argued that such 
areas should be preserved for other uses such as electricity production and recreation. 
Cuesta (2001) has painstakingly described the process of depopulation in Sobrarbe in 
relation to its integration in a global productive system in which the territory was designated 
as both producing energy and constituting a ‘reservoir of territory’. In both cases, spatial 
transformations were related to attempts to colonise the space and support other regions, 
through energy generation for the industrial development of distant cities. Engineers applied 
a logic of accumulation over such ‘reservoirs of territory’ which was materially represented in 
the construction of dams. Local geographers have described Sobrarbe as resulting from a 
process of endogenous colonialism (Pallaruelo, 1984), whereby actors not totally external to 
the territory exploited it for the benefit of uses elsewhere without any resulting benefit for 
local economies. Such ordering took place at every level from the consolidation of a national 
development vision to the disciplining of populations to conform to such vision. Spatially, 
engineers brought with themselves mechanisms of spatial ordering such as land surveying, 
communication infrastructures, demarcating and designating use zones and controlling the 
spread of specific services.  
For example, in the early 1950s in Mediano, the dam works brought big social changes with 
the immediate growth of the population because of the arrival of salaried workers to build the 
dam. The works introduced cash-paid salaries which also brought in commodities and new 
lifestyles. Many interviewees remember, for example, the first purchases of cars in the area. 
Subsistence farming and the traditional social model which tied the fortunes of people to 
their houses became unviable. Former residents of Mediano also remember vividly the 
arrival of a new engineers’ class, which lived in isolation from the rest of the village. These 
engineers, who were defining the futures of everyone living in the village, actively maintained 
their distance from the villagers. Though they lived in the same location, people hardly saw 
them. Engineers and their families had their own social clubs and attended a separated 
church service. Villagers saw them living in opulence, with lifestyles very different to those 
they were accustomed to. The conduct of engineers established a separation between 
villagers and any representatives of the state apparatus so that villagers affected by 
expropriation had nowhere to direct their demands. 
There was no contact between those who established the fate of local area and those who 
were affected by those decisions. In this way, the ordering of space became accompanied 
with an ordering of population: population had to move from areas which “development could 
not reach” to those areas where they could bring their labour to fruition for the envisaged 
modernisation of Spain. This was done in two ways: first, through forcibly removing people 
from designated unproductive areas to those deemed to be productive; second, through the 
dismembering of the local economy. Dams flooded the most productive parts of the valley, 
leaving villagers to survive in fragmented estates of marginal land. Villages like Mediano, at 
the bottom of the valley, were also market towns and constituted nodes of communication for 
a constellation of smaller settlements that could not survive once the market town had 
disappeared.  
Land expropriation was the key means whereby people were forcibly removed from their 
original villages. The process of expropriation was calculated so as to facilitate population 
migration. In the municipal archive of Mediano a note marks the expropriation of the first 
eight estates in 1940. Expropriations of the estates to be flooded, 68 according to a 
‘provisional list’ sent to the municipality to warn residents, took place later. A gap of more 
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than 10 years between the time of the valuations (1942-1954) and the payment (1963) 
meant that the prices actually paid hardly corresponded to the value that the land held for 
residents. Valuation was a key means whereby certain interests were prioritised over others. 
Villagers’ interests were only considered in relation to the possibilities to facilitate their rapid 
movement from the ‘reservoirs’ of space to the flat lands and cities where labour was 
needed. Measures to support the hardship of these villagers also served the state interest of 
space occupation. For example, an Act published on 26/5/1950 allowed the villagers to 
demand a full expropriation, that is, they could ask for the simultaneous expropriation of the 
most fertile land to be flooded by the dam and the marginal lands in highlands. Many 
Mediano residents bequeathed voluntarily all they had.3  
Calculation techniques emerged together with the constitution of subjects who acted upon 
the project of modernity and left it unquestioned. This has been more apparent in the 
constitution of the ideal farmer in the colonisation projects that followed the construction of 
Mediano, in which farmers receiving irrigated land would be instructed to follow a series of 
measures for cultivation, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides which were regularly 
evaluated through visits from agricultural engineers who had the power to dispossess them 
from newly established plots.  In Mediano, people were enrolled not just because traditional 
economies were ill suited for the insertion of the local economy in global economies but also 
because of the lack of alternatives for local development. Hence, many residents actively 
joined the flows of population to those areas which were considered productive.  
In 1953 residents in the nearby villages of Arasanz and Pampalacios requested the full 
expropriation of all their possessions in the hope that the National Institute of Colonisation, 
which regulated new settlements, would give them a plot in one of the new colonisation 
towns. They argued that “if they did not meet the optimal conditions to be a colonial farmer 
according to the requirements of the National Institute of Colonisation, then it should be 
considered that they are forced migrants from the area of the dams of Mediano and El 
Grado, and hence this is not a voluntary request, but one that they make forced by the 
current circumstances”.4 The exchange of land in flooded areas for newly irrigated areas in 
the lowlands was common practice. A small group of former residents stayed behind and 
moved the village to what originally had been a neighbourhood of Mediano called Samitier. 
When they requested governmental support to reconstruct the infrastructures that the dam 
had destroyed, especially the provision of electricity, the civil governor of the province 
responded that this area was not designated as an area that could benefit from ‘that kind of 
help’.5 Thus, governmental support to access modern infrastructures and technologies 
depended both on the fit with the ideal model of colonising farmer and on the specific 
location for which the support was requested.  
This was a calculative effort that attempted to control resources, spaces and populations in 
the name of the deployment of a hydraulic politics portrayed as the national interest and 
which effectively supported the development of an electricity oligopoly. Both people and 
water were a ‘surplus’ that had to be redeployed elsewhere. This effort enrolled many of its 
victims, especially those being displaced by hydraulic projects, creating subjects that could 
                                                          
3
 As documented in a collection of letters dating from august 1951; Archivo Provincial de Huesca, Huesca.  
4
 Municipal archive of Mediano. 
5
 As explained in an exchange of letters between residents, the mayor of Mediano and the civil gobernor dated 
from the 25/05/69, 8/9/69, 1/10/69 and 31/10/69 and preserved in the Municipal Archive of Mediano.  
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be integrated in a new global economics of electricity and agriculture production. Thus, 
hydraulic politics need to be understood within a particular moment in the political history of 
Spain in which the triumvirate of state, energy companies and irrigation associations found a 
fitting narrative and a form of repressive state in which there was no questioning of both the 
goals of hydraulic politics and the technical assessments of the engineers. The political 
transition to democracy, however, brought an entirely new state of affairs for the the 
acceptability of social and environmental impacts. While dams continue to be built (although 
the rate has slowed considerably since the 1990s) there is a serious questioning of their 
inevitability. Thus, while the Mediano case illustrates the governmentalities that made it 
possible for the hydraulic paradigm to subsist for the best part of the 20th century, the case of 
the Jánovas dam in the subsidiary river Ara exemplifies the limits of the technologies of the 
hydraulic paradigm. At the end of the 20th century the arguments about what constituted 
progress and who had a say on it had dramatically changed in Spain. New forms of 
calculation had emerged which pointed towards a deeper examination of environmental 
impacts. The revised plan of Iberduero was finally suspended in 2001 with the publication of 
an environmental impact assessment that emphasised the negative impacts of the project 
over the territory.6 A century too late, the assessment said nothing of the lives of those who 
were affected by the project, and how these changed over the course of a century in the 
constitution of hydropower territories.  
3.3. Hydropower territories and the production of inequality 
Innovation territories create inequalities which cannot be explained away as part of the 
project of spatial and social ordering. In 1951, Iberduero’s revised plan for the Jánovas dam, 
including four jumps, was declared of public interest in a governmental order that established 
that “the company will pay all the damage caused by the dam works and their use. The 
problems derived from the expropriation should be previously examined in their social and 
economic aspects, to compensate the local villagers with humanity and justice…”7 The list of 
affected owners was published in 1960, and affected villages were informed by letter in 
1963.  
 
Iberduero did not treat all the residents in the same way. Initially they attempted friendly 
agreements. Bigger landowners were offered the best deals which they took immediately but 
less fortunate villagers received worse offers. Residents did not know how land prices were 
calculated. By 1966 only five families remained in the town of Jánovas. Then Iberduero 
exchanged voluntary purchase tactics for violent threats. The company’s employees visited 
the village regularly accompanied by the rural police, the Guardia Civil, and threatened 
residents with eviction. Letters as the following demonstrate the absolute disregard that 
some Iberduero employees had for the people displaced:  
 “Because of the works on the Jánovas dam, this enterprise has started the 
demolition of houses acquired through voluntary agreements, as stated in the 
contracts that we have in our hands. Therefore we notify you that to avoid any harm 
you should deliver the keys of your house in the company’s premises. If the key is 
                                                          
6
 «BOE» núm. 36, de 10 de febrero de 2001, páginas 5188 a 5195 (8 págs.) 
7
 Huesca Provincial Archive 
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not delivered, demolition works will go ahead regardless and this company will be 
exempt of responsibilities for any damage that the demolition could cause you”8  
A campaign of physical destruction ensued whose objective was to make the village 
inhabitable. Iberduero’s workers destroyed the houses acquired through voluntary 
expropriation and the common infrastructure to persuade the remaining families to abandon 
it. They even demolished a nearby house next to the school while a class was taking place. 
This was a campaign of terror.  
In the meantime, no works took place in the dam. By then, Iberduero had proposed a larger 
dam more suitable to the growing generation needs of the company. What we see here is 
the constitution of worthless lives, which can be disturbed, ridiculed and threatened, in the 
name of progress. The separation of people from space, the undervaluation of their lives and 
the prioritisation of a technocratic project of electricity production were key elements in the 
creation of hydropower territories in both rivers Cinca and Ara.   
What is less understood is the extent to which the politics of electricity shaped the 
possibilities to access technology. The innovation enthusiasm of the early 20th century had 
supported the creation of numerous small companies with private capital which developed 
small continuous current circuits.  Electricity was generated near the place of use. In 
Sobrarbe, from the early 20th century, there was also a proliferation of “electricity factories”, 
managed as common property, in neighbours associations or  privately, to generate 
electricity where it was consumed. Cuesta (2001) has found archival evidence of 16 such 
electricity factories in Sobrarbe which operated at low power (from 3Kw to 30kw). These 
factories provided lighting and power services. While the supply of electricity in this manner 
had evident problems, especially regarding the reliability of the service, ‘electricity factories’ 
enabled local residents direct control over the use of electricity production technologies.  
These electricity factories disappeared with the arrival of large national utilities for energy 
production and distribution. They operated at a very small scale and hence, they were 
almost irrelevant for big utility companies except in cases in which they were absorbed into 
the network, for example, to support transmission services. The presence of the big utilities 
in Sobrarbe, such as Iberduero, since the late 1920s meant the incorporation of larger 
population centres into larger networks. Electricity factories continued to operate in marginal 
spaces which were not provided by larger companies because they were unprofitable. The 
gradual deterioration of technologies, migration of population, dwindling local capital and the 
lack of institutional support meant that local electricity factories gradually disappeared. In 
some cases, the local electricity network was maintained in precarious condition via the 
reutilisation of abandoned infrastructure. In some cases, one villager alone had to maintain 
the installation with limited capacity and considerable risk. Many villages lost the electricity 
supply and were not electrified until the democratic transition of 1975-1978, when  the 
construction of infrastructure became a priority to stop a perceived rural exodus. With the 
loss of electricity factories, habitability conditions in remote villages deteriorated. There was 
also a missed opportunity to develop locally adapted technologies and communal institutions 
for energy production, in favour of a centralised, large-scale model of electricity generation 
and distribution.  
                                                          
8
 Letter sent to Emilio Garcés. Private records. Translated by the author.   
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Thus, the constitution of a national electricity network in Spain was translated into specific 
politics of inequality production, both in terms of how spaces were shaped and who could 
access the process of technology enhancement and development. Innovation territories 
were not just ascribed to specific political visions and mechanisms of calculation, but also to 
the structuration of the technological space with implications for the politics of transitions.  
4. Conclusion 
While the renewable transition is still unfolding, the previous transition towards a unified 
energy network during the dictatorship in Spain demonstrates that the entrenchment of 
socio-technical regimes depends on the constitution of innovation territories, and these in 
turn are an expression of political technologies that influence energy transitions.    
The notion of political technology makes explicit the spatial and political aspects of 
transitions. Focusing on innovation territories highlights the construction of visions as a 
political process with spatial implications and their dependence on suitable techniques of 
calculation, which refer both to the control of space and populations. Moreover, the notion of 
innovation territories emphasises that socio-technological change is tied to the production of 
inequalities, especially regarding the capacity of certain social groups to actively steer 
transitions to sustainability.  
In Spain, the constitution of specific visions of hydropower territories was made visible in the 
constitution of the modern electricity system in Spain in which a modernity project was tied to 
idiosyncratic hydraulic politics that focused on reimagining the figure of the labourer for the 
progress of the nation. Diverse methods of calculation and territorial control were deployed 
in the constitution of hydraulic politics, from the design of the dams themselves to the 
constitution of appropriate regulatory and valuation frameworks that would ensure such 
politics achieved the envisage purpose. In this process there was a demarcation of spaces 
of exclusion and inclusion, made visible for example, through the process of expropriation as 
well as through a process in which particular socio-technical configurations- within a unified, 
centralised network- were favoured over decentralised models of electricity provision.  
Changing political landscapes meant a challenge for carefully constructed technological 
territories. With the advent of democracy the conditions for the maintenance of the hydraulic 
regime rapidly deteriorated. While some remnants of this form of hydraulic/hydropower 
politics persist, projects like Jánovas- and the violence associated to them- are not 
conceivable today. This leads to a broader question about the extent to which changes in the 
landscape, the ebb and flow over which regime actors have no influence, may render 
successful political technologies unviable. On the one hand, while territories may be 
characterised by strategic projects of socio-technical change, they may also be appropriated 
through time, history and everyday practices into particular socio-technical landscapes in 
which the strategic project is reimagined. On the other hand a particular politics of socio-
technical change may lead to processes of institutional path-dependency.  
The Spanish electric utilities adapted rapidly to the waning influence of the hydraulic 
paradigm changing the structures of energy generation and investing in thermal and nuclear 
energy and, more recently, in renewables. The institutional configuration of electric utilities 
supported the hydraulic paradigm for more than 40 years, and effectively constituted an 
electric oligopoly in Spain. This was built upon an alliance with the state apparatus that has 
remained at the heart of electricity policy. While public opinion and environmental concerns 
changed during the transition to democracy, the state and the electric oligopoly have 
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maintained the institutional regime of electricity generation and distribution virtually 
unchanged. Current innovation territories prevent actors outside this alliance to innovate in 
electricity generation and distribution, hence curtailing alternative pathways for transitions to 
sustainability.  
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